We present a secure communication protocol which allows direct secure communication. Using quantum nonlocality, information is transferred in a deterministic manner. The security of this protocol is based on the 'High fidelity implies low entropy'. In fact, the eavesdropper-Eve can use a denial-of-service (DoS) attack to destroy a quantum communication,e.g., she can destroy the travel photon to stop a communication. But our protocol can protect communication against the DoS attack in theory.
It is well known this single state can be used to establish nonlocal correlations over a spacelike interval, but these correlation cannot be used for superluminal communication [9] . Alice sends one of the photon, say A, to Bob, and keeps another. If Bob performs a measurement on the qubit A in the basis B Z = {|0 >, |1 >}, then the single state will collapse immediately to a product state and the entanglement does not exist. If Bob obtains |0 > by his measurement, when Alice performs a measurement on his photon in the basis B Z , Alice will obtain |1 >. If Bob obtains |1 >, then Alice will obtain |0 >. But what Bob obtains is random with a probability p = 0.5. So Bob can gain nothing about Alice's information only with a local measurement on his photon. To successfully transmit message from Alice to Bob, a reliable public channel is required. After Bob received the qubit Alice sent, he performs a measurement in basis B Z . Then he sends a single to Alice through public channel (This can be called as Bob ′ s receipt.). When Alice receives Bob's receipt, she performs a measurement in basis B Z on the photon she keeps. Suppose Alice gets |0 >, then she knows Bob's measurement result is |1 >. If Alice want to transmit a logical "0" to Bob, then she 'say no' to Bob through public channel. If Alice want to transmit a logical "1", then she 'say yes' to Bob through public channel. And Bob will get Alice's code when he compares his measurement result with Alice's public message. Also, when Alice's measurement result is |1 >, she can use the same method described above to transmit a classical bit to Bob together with a public channel. As the same as the 'ping-pong' protocol [8] , there are two modes, "message mode " and "control mode" here. By default, Alice and Bob are in message mode and communicate the way described above. With probability c, Bob switches to control mode. In control mode. After Bob received the qubit Alice sent, he performs a measurement randomly (with a probability p = 0.5) in the basis B X = {ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 } or B Z = {|0 >, |1 >},
Using public channel, he sends the result to Alice. When Alice receives the result, she also switches to control mode and performs a measurement in the same basis Bob used. Alice compares her result with Bob's result. If both results coincide, Alice knows that an eavesdropper-Eve is in the line and stops the communication. Else, this communication continues. This protocol can be described explicitly like this:
(1) Alice prepares two qubit in the Bell state |ψ − >. (2) Alice sends one of the qubit to Bob and keeps another. (3) Bob receives the qubit. With probability c, he switches to the control mode (4c). Else, she performs the message mode (4m).
(4c) Bob performs a measurement on his qubit randomly in the basis B X or B Z and tells Alice the result through public channel. Alice then performs a measurement in the same basis Bob used. If she finds both results coincided, then she stops the communication. Else, this communication continues.
(4m) Bob performs a measurement in the basis B Z . Then he sends his receipt to Alice through public channel. Alice then performs a measurement in the basis B Z . When Alice wants to transmit a logical "0" to Bob, if her result is |1 >, she 'say yes' to Bob through public channel, else, she 'say no' to Bob. When Alice wants to transmit a logical "1" to Bob, if her result is |0 >, she 'say yes' to Bob through public channel, else, she 'say no' to Bob. After this, Alice sends next qubit to Bob.
(5) When all of Alice's information is transmitted, this communication is successfully terminated. Security proof. There are four states in the Bell's basis, |ψ − >, the measurement will not coincide. Since Bob selects the measurement basis randomly in control mode, the detection probability d is at least d ≥ 0.5 when their state is one of {|ψ + >, |φ ± >}. In order to be practical and secure, a QKD scheme must be based on existing-or nearly existing-technology, but its security must be guaranteed against an eavesdropper whose technology is limited only by the laws of quantum mechanics [10] . [11] . Suppose ε is a general quantum operation. Then it is possible to find out an ancilla, E, initially in a pure state |e >< e| uncorrelated with the system, a unitary U ,
After Eve's attack, the fidelity of states |ψ − > and ρ ′ is
Let us assume that
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Because of the completeness of the Bell's states, it has that the detection probability d is approximately dependent on the quantity γ, d ≥ 0.5γ. Let us consider the information Eve can gain when the fidelity of the states |ψ − > and ρ ′ is √ 1 − γ. 'High fidelity implies low entropy' [7, 11, 12] . If γ << 1, the von Neumann entropy
When γ = 0, which means that Eve can not be detected, no information Eve can gain on this condition. Because of F (|ψ − >, ρ) 2 = 1 − γ, then the entropy of ρ ′ is bounded above by the entropy of a diagonal density matrix ρ max with the diagonal entries 1 − γ, γ/3, γ/3, γ/3. The upper bound information that Eve can gain from ρ ′ is determinated by
Obviously, when γ = 0, i.e., Alice and Bob has zero probability to find Eve in line, the information that Eve can gain is zero. When Eve want to gain Alice's information, she has to face a nonzero risk that she was detected. When Eve want to get full of Alice's information, the function S(ρ max ) will get to its maximal value. Let δ(S(ρ max )) = 0, it has γ = 3 4 . The detection is d ≥ 3 8 on this condition. Since this von Neumann entropy is a continued function of γ, we know that the more information Eve want to gain, the bigger risk that Eve has to face. The information I 0 (d) Eve can gain in every message mode is approximately dependent on the detection probability d(I 0 ). Taking into account the probability c of a control run, the effective transmission rate is r = 1 − c. The probability of Eve's eavesdropping one message transfer without being detected is [8] 
where d is the detection probability in the control mode. After n protocol run, the probability to successfully eavesdrop
For c > 0, d > 0, this value decreases exponentially. In the limit n → ∞, we have s → 0. So this protocol is asymptotically secure. In principle, the security can arbitrarily be improved by increasing the control parameter c at cost of decreasing the transmission rate. In practice, we can use a small c, which will improves the efficiency of the communication. To realize a perfectly secure communication, we must abandon the direct transfer in favor of a key transfer [8] . Instead of transmitting the message directly to Alice, Bob will take a random sequence of N bits from a secret random number generator. After a successful transmission, the random sequence is used as a shared secret key between Bob and Alice. Bob and Alice can choose classical privacy amplification protocols, which make it very hard to decode parts of the message with only some of the key bits given. So Eve has virtually no advantage in eavesdropping only a few bits. When Eve is detected, the transfer stops. Then Eve has nothing but a sequence of nonsense random bits. Denial − of − attack. In practice, Eve can destroy a quantum communication through a denial-of-service attack [13, 14] . In BB84 protocol, Alice sends (4n + δ) photons to transmit n bit message. If Eve want to destroy the communication, she can destroy every travel photon. In the secure direct ping-pong communication protocol, the travel photon can be destroyed either in line B → A or in line A → B. Then the communication has to be stopped. However, in our protocol, travel qubit only travel from Alice to Bob. In principle, Alice and Bob can share the EPR pairs in a secure way (using a big parameter c) in their free time first. If the EPR pairs were successfully shared (this can be realized in practice), they can keep the EPR pairs freely. When Alice and Bob want to communicate securely, they can use their shared EPR pairs. Alice and Bob will perform some local measurement and announce some public message to securely communicate to each other. On this occasion, Eve has no chance to destroy their communication if the public channel is reliable.
Experimental f easibility. Experimental quantum key distribution was demonstrated for first time by Bennett, et al [15] . Since then, single photon source have been studied in recent years and a great variety of approaches has been proposed and implemented [16] . Today, several groups have shown that quantum key distribution is possible, even outside the laboratory. In principle, any two-level quantum system could be used to implement quantum cryptography. In practice, all implementations have relied on photons. The reason is that their decoherence can be controlled and moderated. The technological challenges of the quantum cryptography are the questions of how to produce single photons, how to transmit them, how to detect single photons, and how to exploit the intrinsic randomness of quantum processes to build random generators [17] . Considered the experimental feasibility of this protocol, the Bell state can be created by parametric down − conversion. And the values of σ x , σ y , and σ z of a qubit of an single photon can be ascertained [18] .
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